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Abstract 
In the 1940's, a physicist named Cox provided 
the fir�t formal justification for the axioms of 
probability based on the subjective or Bayesian 
interpretation. He showed that if a measure of 
belief satisfies several fundamental properties, then 
the measure must be some monotonic 
transformation of a probability. In this paper, 
measures of change in belief or belief updates are 
examined. In the spirit of Cox, properties for a 
measure of change in belief are enumerated. It is 
shown that if a measure satisfies these properties, 
it must satisfy other restrictive conditions. For 
example, it is shown that belief updates in a 
probabilistic context must be equal to some 
monotonic transformation of a likelihood ratio. lt 
is hoped that this formal explication of the belief 
update paradigm will facilitate critical discussion 
and useful extensions of the approach. 
Introduction 
As researchers in artificial intelligence have begun to tackle 
real-world domains such as medical diagnosis, mineral 
exploration, and financial planning, there has been increasing 
interest in the development and refinement of methods for 
reasoning with uncertainty. Much of the work in this area 
has been focused on methods for the representation and 
manipulation of measures of absolute belief, quantities which 
reflect the absolute degree to which propositions are believed. 
There has also been much interest in methodologies which 
focus on measures of change in belief or belief updates1, 
quantities which reflect the degree to which beliefs in 
propositions change when evidence about them becomes 
known. Such methodologies include the MYClN certainty 
factor model [5], the PROSPECTOR scoring scheme [6], and 
the application of Dempster's Rule to the combination of 
"weights of evidence" [7]. 
In this paper. a formal explication of the belief update 
paradigm is given. The presentation is modeled after the 
work of a physicist named R.T. Cox. In 1946, Cox [8] 
enumerated a small set of intuitive properties for a measure 
of ahsolute belief and proved that any measure that satisfies 
these properties must be some monotonic transformation of a 
probability. In the same spirit, a set of properties or axioms 
that are intended to capture the notion of a belief update are 
enumerated. It is then shown that these properties place 
strong restrictions on measures of change in belief. For 
example, it is shown that the only measures which satisfy the 
properties in a probabilistic context are monotonic 
transformations of the likelihood ratio 
>.(H.E,e) = p(EiH,e)/p(EHl,e), where H is a hypothesis, E is 
a piece of evidence relevant to the hypothesis, and e is 
background information. 
It should be emphasized that the gonl of this axiomization 
is not to prove that belief updates can only take the form 
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described above. Rather, it is hoped that a formal 
explication of the update paradigm will stimulate constructive 
research in this area. For example, the axioms presented here 
can serve as a tool for the iden(if.ication and communication 
of dissatisfaction with the update approach. . Given the 
properties for a belief update, a researcher may be able to 
pinpoint the source of his dissatisfaction and criticize one or 
more of the properties directly. In addition, a precise 
characterization of the update paradigm can be useful in 
promoting consistent use of the approach. This is important 
as methodologies which manipulate measures of change in 
belief have been used inconsistently in the past [9]. Finally, 
it is hoped that the identification of assumptions underlying 
the paradigm will allow implementors to better judge the 
appropriateness of the method for application in a given 
domain. · 
Although there has been much discussion concerning the 
foundations of methodologies which focus on measures of 
absolute belief [8, 10, 11]. there have been few efforts 
directed at measures of change in belief. Notable exceptions 
are the works of Popper [12] and Good [13]. Popper 
proposed a set of properties or axioms that reflect his notion 
of belief update which he called corroboration and Good 
showed that the likelihood ratio >-(H,E,e) satisfies these 
properties [13]. Unfortunately, Popper's desiderata are 
somewhat non-intuitive and restricted to a probabilistic 
context. The axiomization here is offered as an alternative. 
Scope of the axlomization 
The process of reasoning under uncertainty can be 
decomposed into three components: problem formulation, 
belief assignment, and belief entailment. Problem formulation 
refers to the process of enumerating the propositions or 
events of interest as well as the possible outcomes of each 
proposition. Belief assignmenr refers to the process of 
constructing and measuring beliefs about propositions of 
interest. Finally, belief entailment refers to the process of 
deriving beliefs from beliefs assessed in the second phase. 
It must be emphasized that most methods for reasoning 
with uncertainty, including those in which belief updates are 
central, focus primarily on the third component described 
above.2 Indeed, it could be argued that a significant portion 
of the controversy over the adequacy of various methods for 
reasoning with uncertainty has stemmed from a lack of 
appreciation of this fact.3 The axiomization of the belief 
update paradigm presented here similarly restricts its focus to 
the process of belief entailment. 
Fundamental properties for a measure of 
absolute belief 
Before presenting the axiomization for belief updates, 1t JS 
useful to consider the properties Cox enumerated for a 
measure of absolute belief. This discussion will help 
motivate the characterization of measures of change in belief 
as it is similar in spirit. In addition, several of the 
properties for a measure of absolute belief will be needed for 
the explication of the belief update paradigm. 
The first property proposed by Cox concerns the nature of 
propositions to which beliefs can be assigned. He asserted 
that propositions must be defined precisely enough so that it 
would be possible to determine whether a proposition is 
indeed true or false. That is, a proposition should be 
defined clearly enough that an all-knowing cfainoyant could 
determine its truth or falsehood. This requirement will be 
called the clarity property.4 
A .second property asserted by Cox is that it is possible to 
assign a degree of belief to any proposition which is 
precisely defined. This property will be termed the 
completeness property. 
Cox also asserted that a measure of belief can vary 
continuously between values of absolute truth and falsehood 
and that the continuum of belief can be represented by a 
single real number. For definiteness, it will be assumed that 
larger numbers correspond to larger degrees of belief. The 
use of a single real number to represent continuous measures 
of belief will be called the scalar continuity property. 
Another fundamental assumptiOil made by Cox is that the 
degree of belief for a proposition will depend on the current 
state of information of the individual assessing the belief. 
To emphasize this, the term Pie, read "P given e," will be 
used to denote the degree of belief in proposition P for some 
individual with information e. This assumption will be 
termed the context dependency property. 
Now consider two propositions P and Q. If P and Q are 
logically equivalent then Pie = Qle. That is, if P Is true only 
when Q is true and vice-versa, an individual should believe 
each of them with equal conviction. Thus, for example, it 
must be that XYie = YXIe where XY denotes the proposition 
"X AND Y." This axiom will be called the consistency 
property. 
Another property asserted by Cox is that the belief in the 
conjunction PQ should be related to the belief in P alone 
and to the belief in Q given that P is true. Formally, Cox 
proposed that there exists some function F such that 
POle = F(Pie. QIPe). ( 1) 
The function is asserted to be continuous in both arguments 
and monotonically increasing5 in each argument when the 
other is held constant. This property captures the notion that 
individuals commonly assign belief to events conditioned on 
the truth of another. This property will be termed the 
hypothetical conditioning property. 
Finally, Cox asserted that the belief in �P (not P) should 
be related to the belief in P. Formally, he asserted that there 
should be some function G such that 
�PIE = G(Pie). (2) 
The only restrictions placed on G are that it be continuous 
and monotonically decreasing. This assumption will be called 
the complementarity property. 
After enumerating these properties, Cox proved that any 
measure which satisfies them must also satisfy the relations: 
0 :5 H(Pie) :5 (3) 
H(TRUEie) (4) 
H(PQie) = H(Pie) · H(QIPe) (product rule) ( 5) 
H(Pie) + H(�Pie) = 1. ( s um rule) (6) 
where H is a monotonically increasing function. However 
(3) - (6) implies that H(Pie) is a probability. That is. (3) 
124 
- ( 6) correspond to the axioms of probability theory. 
Therefore, Cox demonstrated that if one accepts the above 
properties, one must accept that probability is the only 
admissible measure of absolute belief. 
Cox's proof is simple and elegant. The reader is urged to 
consult the original work to gain a better appreciation of the 
argument. The work also contains an interesting discussion 
by Cox arguing for each of the properties he describes. 
In the sections to follow, an argument analogous to Cox's 
for belief updates is presented. As mentioned above, there 
will be little effort made to justify the properties enumerated. 
Instead, it is hoped that this exposition will foster 
constructive discussion about the usefulness of the update 
paradigm. 
Fundamental properties for a measure of change 
in belief . 
Suppose an individual with background information e has a 
belief in some hypothesis H for which a piece of evidence E 
becomes known. The basic assumption of the update 
par�digm is that a belief update, denoted U(H,E,e), in 
conjunction with the prior belief, Hie, is sufficient for 
determining the posterior belief HIEe. More formally, it is 
assumed that there exists some function f such that 
HIEe = f(U(H,E,e), Hie). (7) 
In the paradigm, the quantities U(H.E.e), Hie. and HIEe are 
all single real numbers. In addition, it is required that the 
function f be continuous in both arguments and that f be 
monotonically increasing in each argument when the other is 
held constant. 
Equation (7) is the definition of a belief update. Note that 
only the context dependency property and the scalar 
continuity property for a measure of absolute belief have 
been assumed in this definition. 
It is useful to view the function f in (7) as an updating 
procedure which operates on a prior belief and returns a 
poste�ior belief. The procedure, in turn, is parameterized by 
the smgle parameter U(H,E,e), a function of the hypothesis 
being updated, the evidence producing the update, and �he 
ba�kg_round. info.rmation in which the update takes place. Th1s IS depleted 111 the upper diagram of Figure 1. 
For comparison, the Bayesian conditioning scheme is 
represented schematically in the lower diagram of the same 
figure. Corresponding to the updating procedure in the 
belief update paradigm is the axiomatic engine of probability 
theory. The axiomatic engine, in turn, is "parameterized" by 
the full joint distribution. Inputs to the Bayesian updating 
procedure include the propositions of interest and outputs 
consist of beliefs relating to these propositions. 
An important difference between the two approaches is 
illustrated in the figure. In the Bayesian theory, the process 
of updating is implicit; it is a matter of course that the 
belief in a given proposition changes when the conditioning 
propositions are modified (recall Cox's context dependency 
property). In contrast, the process of updating is made 
explic_it in the update paradigm. As a consequence, the Bayes1an scheme can treat hypothesis and evidence 
symmetrically while the update approach cannot. For 
example, the calculation of p(EIHe) in the Bayesian approach 
is no different in principle then the calculation of p(HIEe). 
In the update approach, however, the roles of evidence and 
hypothesis would have to be exchanged in order to 
implement the calculation of p(EiHe). 
In addition to the definition above, there are two 
funda�ental proper�ies that are ascribed to belief updates. 
The f1rst property IS analogous to the consistency property 
for absolute beliefs. It is assumed that if the arguments of a 
belief update are logically equivalent, then the belief updates 
must have the same value. That is, if H1 ""' H2, E1 = E2, 
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Prior belief: 
Hi e 
Hypothesis 
of Interest: 
H 
Conditioning 
evidence: 
E 
Updating 
procedure 
Belief update: 
U(H,E ,e) 
Joint 
distribution 
Posterior belief: 
HI Ee 
Prior belief: 
p(H I e) 
Posterior belief: 
p(H I Ee) 
Figure 1: The belief update paradigm vs. Bayesian updating 
and e1 = e2, then U(H1,E1,e1) = U(H2,E2,e2). This will be 
called the consistency property for belief updates. 
The second property concerns the combination of belief 
updates. Consider the situation corresponding to the upper 
path in Figure 2. The prior belief in hypothesis H, Hie, is 
updated by evidence E1 in the context e. Then, the posterior 
belief, HIE1e, is updated with a second piece of evidence E2• 
Note the third argument of the second belief update, 
U(H,E2,E1e), contains E1 as part of the context. The result is 
the belief in H given both E1 and E2, HIE1 E2e. 
Alternatively, the belief in H could be updated with both 
pieces of evidence simultaneously as depicted in the bottom 
path in Figure 2. In the belief update paradigm, it is 
asserted that the two separate updates, U(H,E1,e) and 
U(H,E2,E1e), can be combined directly to give U(H,E1 E2,e). 
Formally, it is assumed that there exists some function g su�·h 
that 
U(H,E1E2,e) = g(U(H,E1,e), U(H,E2.E1e)). (8) 
The only constraints on g is that it be continuous in both 
arguments and monotonically increasing in each argument 
when the other is held constant. This will be called the 
combination property for belief updates. 
Hi e 
Updating 
procedure: 
I 
Updating 
L-----3>1 procedure: 1------� 
f 
Figure 2: The combination of belief updates 
A consequence of the axioms 
Although the properties above seem fairly general, they 
greatly restrict the quantities that may serve as belief updates. 
In particular, it is shown in this section that any measure 
which satisfies the definition of belief updates and the two 
properties above must also satisfy the relation: 
h(U(H,E,e)) 2 1(H1Ee) - i(Hie) (9) 
where h and i are monotonic functions. In words, a belief 
update U(H,E,e) is simply the arithmetic difference of a 
posterior and prior belief, up to an arbitrary monotonic 
transformation. Of course, any quantity which satisfies (9) 
must also satisfy (7) and (8). Indeed, (9) is directly suggested 
by the term "update." However, in this section it is shown 
that (9) is a necessary condition for an update, a stronger 
result. Equation (9) will be called the difference property 
for belief updates. 
Consider three items of evidence E1, E2, and E3 for 
hypothesis H. Applying the combination property, (8), to 
(E1 E2) and E3 and then to E1 and E2 gives: 
U(H, (E1E2)E3,e) 
g(U(H.E1E2.e), U(H.E3.E1E2e)) 
g(g(U(H,E1,e), U(H,E2,E1e)), U(H,E3,E1E2e)). 
Equation (8) can also be used to first expand E1 and (E2E3) 
and then E2 and E3 giving: 
U( H, E 1 ( E2E3), e) 
g(U(H,E1,e), U(_H,E2E3,E1e)) 
g(U(H,E1,e), g(U(H,E2,E1e), U(H,E3,E1E2e)}). 
However, (E1E2)E3 and E1(E2E3) are logically equivalent and 
therefore, by the consistency property, these two expressions 
must be equal. That is, 
g(g(x,y), z) = g(x, g(y,z)) ( 10) 
where x = U(H,E1,e), y = · U(H,E2,E1e), and 
z = U(H,E3,E1E2e). Equation (10) is called a junctional 
equation. Using group theory, Aczel has shown that the most 
general sol uti on to this equation is 
h(g(x,y)) = h(x) + h(y) 
where h is some continuous, monotonic function [14). 
Therefore, it follows from the combination property, (8), that 
h(U(H,E1E2,e)) ( 11) 
= h(U(H,E1,e)) + h(U(H,E2,E1e)). 
Note the power of Aczel's result. It says that any continuous, 
monotonic function of two arguments that satisfies an 
associativity relation must necessarily be additive in some 
transformed space. 
Now consider the definition of belief updates, (7). Given 
that the composition of two monotonic functions is another 
monotonic function, (7) can be rewritten as 
HIEe = f(h(U(H,E,e)), Hie). (12) 
Note that the function f in (12) is not equal to the function 
f in (7). The same symbol is used to avoid the proliferation 
of unnecessary terms. 
Given this new version of the definition, consider again the 
situation in Figure 2. The upper path in the figure 
corresponds to the expansion: 
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HIE2(E1e) 
f(h(U(H,E2,E1e)), HIE1e) 
f(h(U(H,E2,E1e)), f(h(U(H,E1,e)), Hie)) 
while the lower path corresponds to the expansion: 
HI (E1E2)e 
= f(h(U(H,E1E2,e), Hie)) 
= f(h(U(H,E1,e)) + h(U(H,E2,E1e)), Hie) 
In the first expansion, (12) is applied to each item of 
evidence separately. In the second, (12) is applied to the 
combined evidence E1 and E2 and then (11) is used to 
expand the update. By the consistency property, these two 
expansions must be equal. Therefore, 
f(x + y, z) = f(x, f(y, z)) 
where x = h(U(H.E2,E1e)), y = h(U(H,E1,e)), and z = Hie. 
This is another functional equation. The most general 
solution is 
i(f(x,y)) = x + i(y) 
where 1 is another continuous, monotonic function [14]. 
Therefore, it can concluded from (7) that 
1(HJEe) = h(U(H,E,e)) + 1(HJe) 
which establishes the desired result. 
Probabilistic belief updates 
In the remainder of the paper, measures of change in belief 
will be considered in a probabilistic context. That is, the 
implications of the axioms of belief updates will be explored 
under the assumption that each of Cox's properties are valid. 
Before discussing the general case, however, it is useful to 
examine a particular probabilistic update. Consider the 
following version of Bayes' theorem for updating the 
probability of a hypothesis H given evidence E and the 
current state of information e: 
p(HJEe) = 
p(EJHe)p(HJe) 
(13) 
p(Eie) 
Note that this relationship follows directly from (5). The 
corresponding formula for the negation of the hypothesis, 
� H . is 
p( E I e.) 
Dividing (13) by (14) gives: 
p(HJEe) p(EIHe) p(Hie) 
p(�HJEe) p(EJ�He) p(�HJe) 
Now the odds of some event X, denoted O(X), is just 
O(X) = p(X)/p(�X) = p( X)/(1 - p(X)) 
so that (15) can be written as 
p(EIHe) 
O(HJEe) = -------- O(HJE). 
p(EJ�He} 
(14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
The ratio in (16) is called a likelihood ratio and is written 
A(H,E,e). With this notation, (16) becomes 
O(HIEe) = A(H,E,e) O(HJe). (17) 
Equation (17) is called the odds-likelihood form of Bayes' 
theorem. Notice that >.(H,E,e) and the prior odds are 
sufficient to determine the posterior odds. Moreover, since 
the odds of any event is a monotonic function of the 
probability of the event, it follows from (17) that the 
likelihood ratio X(H,E,e) satisfies the definition of a belief 
update (7). 
It is also straightforward to show that X(H,E,e) satisfies the 
combination property for updates, (8). Consider two items 
of evidence E1 and E2• The likelihood ratio for the 
combined evidence E1 and E2 is 
p(E1E2JHe} 
>.{H,E1E2,e) = -----------. 
p( E1E21 �He} 
Using the product rule (5),. both the numerator and 
denominator In the above expression can be expanded giving: 
p(E1E21He) p(E1JHe) p(E2JHE1e) 
p(E1E2J�He) p(E1J�He) p(E2J�HE1e) 
From the definition of X it follows that 
( 18) 
Thus, the likelihood ratio X(H,E,e) satisfies the combination 
property, (8), where the function g is simple multiplication. 
Moreover, since the consistency property for updates is 
trivially satisfied in a probabilistic context. it follows that 
the likelihood ratio A is a legitimate belief update. 
The quantity X has several interesting properties. For 
example, A satisfies the difference property, as it must given 
the previous discussion. In particular. taking the logarithm 
of (17) and subtracting gives 
log[X(H,E,e)] = log[O(HJEe)] - log[O(Hfe)]. 
Another interesting property arises from assumptions of 
probabilistic independence. Suppose knowing E1 does not 
influence one's belief in E2 if it is known that either H or 
�H is true. That is, 
p{E2JHE1e) = p(E2JHe) and 
p(E2f�HE1e) = p(E2f�He). 
( 19) 
Of course, this relationship is conditioned on the current 
state of information e. When (19) holds, it is said that E2 is 
conditionally independent of E1 given H and �H. With this 
assumption, it immediately follows from the definition of 
A(H,E,e) that 
(20) 
That is, the belief update for E2 given E1 does not depend 
on E1• More generally, 
(21) 
Equation (21) will be called the modularity property for 
belief updates. This term is used because the above property 
closely resembles the informal notion of modularity 
associated with rule based systems [15]. 
Notice that the conditional independenre assurnplion, (19), 
and the modularity property, (21), are both assumptions of 
independence but relate to different wa}s of thinking about 
the association between evidence and hypothesis. In asserting 
(19). one imagines that a hypothesis is either true or false 
with certainty and then contemplates the relationship between 
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two pieces of evidence for the hypothesis. In asserting (21), 
one imagines that a piece of evidence is certain and then 
considers how this affects the updating of the hypothesis by 
a second piece of evidence. From above, it is clear that these 
two independence conditions are closely related in a 
probabilistic context. In particular, when the identification 
U(H,E,e) = >.(H,E,e) is made, it follows that 
p{E2IHE1e) = p{E21He) and 
p(E2I�HE1e) = p(E2I�He) 
=> U(H,E2,E1e) = U(H,E2,e). {22) 
This will be referred to as the independence correspondence 
for probabilistic belief updates. 
In the remainder of this section, a general result conceming 
the independence correspondl'nce will be derived. In 
particular, it will be shown that any probabilistic belief 
update satisfying the independence correspondence must be 
some monotonic transformation of >.. 
To begin, consider the difference property in a 
probabilistic context6: 
h{U(H,E,e)) = i(p{HjEe)) - i{p{Hje)). 
Because i is monotonic, (23) can be rewritten as 
h{U(H,E,e)) 
log[j{p{HjEe)/1-p{HIEe))] 
- log[j{p{Hie)/1-p{Hie))] 
log[j(O{HjEe))/j{O(Hje))] 
{23) 
{24) 
where j is another continuous, monotonic function. Now 
when the conditional independence assumption, (19), is valid, 
it follows from Bayes' theorem that 
O(Hje) 
In addition, it follows from (24) and the modularity property 
that 
j{O(HIE2E1e))/j(O(HIE1e)) 
= j(O(HIE2e))/j(O(Hje)). 
Therefore, the independence correspondence implies 
w/x = y/z => j(w)/j(x) = j(y)/j(z) 
where w = 0(HIE1E2e), x = O(HIE1e), y = 0(HIE2e), and 
z = O(Hie). The most general solution is [14]: 
j( X) = o xA 
where A and o are constants. This means that 
i(x) = A·log[x/1-x] 
and so 
O(HjEe) 
h(U(H,E,e)) A·log A·log[>.(H,E,e)] 
O(Hje) 
or 
U(H,E,e) h-1{A·log[>.(H.E,e)]} 
which establishes the desired result. 
Thus, the likelihood ratio >. is a general belief update in 
the probabilistic context. The quantity >. and monotonic 
transformations of it are the only measures which satisfy the 
axioms of belief updates in addition to the correspondence 
betwl'en probabilistic conditional independence and 
modularity. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, a formal characterization of the belief update 
paradigm has been presented and several consequences of the 
characterization have been demonstrated. It is hoped that 
this explication will foster critical discussion and useful 
extensions of the approach. 
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Notes 
1The terms "weight of evidence" [3] "measure of 
confirmation" [1, 5, 7] and "measure of corroboration" [12] 
have also been ascribed to this quantity. 
2An exception is the formalization of belief measurement 
in the Bayesian theory [ 4, 10]. However, the theory does not 
attempt to formalite the process of belief construction. 
3The components of reasoning under uncertainty and the 
limited scope of most methods for reasoning under 
uncertainty are discussed in more detail in [2]. 
4The terminology for fundamental properties of belief is 
introducl'd in [2]. 
5Actually, the function need only be strictly monotonic in 
the interior of its domain. For example, when P is false, PQ 
will also be falsl' no matter what the value of Q!Pe. 
Therefore, F is not increasing in its second argument when 
Pie takes on the extreme value corresponding to "FALSE." 
This caveat applies to all functions of two arguments 
mentioned in this paper that are required to be monotonic. 
6The function i should be renamed since, by Cox's result, 
Hie and p(Hie) are related by a monotonic transformation. 
As before, the same name will be retained to avoid the 
proliferation of notation. 
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